Insurgency and terrorism in the Sahel: Not yet uhuru
By Dr MS Abubakar
As someone who often leans towards metaphysical ideas and beliefs, I find it uncomfortable to associate with negativity. Thus, I hesitate to launch this brief piece on a somber note. Yet, what purpose does deceiving both my readers and I serve? I’ve decided to embrace a more pessimistic tone because it reflects reality. The harsh truth regarding the cessation of violence and the pursuit of peace in northern Nigeria and the broader Sahel region is that if we maintain our current approach, insurgency, terrorism, and banditry could persist for another ten years. This assertion can be substantiated by data and evidence, which I’ll present shortly. However, before diving into those details, let’s first explore the Sahel Region for those unfamiliar with its geographical scope.
The Sahel, a vast expanse of savannah in Africa, spans from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, characterized by a rich tapestry of ethnicities reflecting its varied geography and climate. This region comprises a series of mostly neighboring nations that rarely make headlines or are considered as a unified entity. However, in recent years, it has become a focal point for analysts and decision-makers. The overthrow of Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, along with an influx of Tuareg mercenaries taking refuge in luxury hotels in Nouakchott, has led to significant unrest in northern Mali, the rise of Boko Haram, and a persistent wave of jihadist violence in Nigeria. Additionally, instances of expatriate kidnappings in Niger and Mali, along with rising populist fears in the West, have elevated the Sahel’s profile within the global security landscape. This region, which includes parts of Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, the Central African Republic, portions of Cameroon, Chad, and Sudan, is increasingly recognized as a pivotal front in the international fight against terrorism.
I am compelled to write this article on insecurity in the Sahel because of the debilitating security situation of the Sahel beginning from January 2025 where scores of expatriates were taken hostage in Niger and Mali, and thousands killed and displaced in Burkina Faso. The ongoing conflict in Sudan is a spectacular case in point where a former non-state actor, to be precise the promoter of the Janjaweed insurgents has suddenly assumed the rank of a general and is unleashing havoc on innocent citizens because of power. The situation is no different in Nigeria where ISWAP terrorists have resumed their barbaric acts of slaughtering soldiers and civilians alike. Terrorists and insurgents’ groups like ISWAP,JNIM, Mahmudawa seemed to have come to stay in the Sahel as we can see how they challenge the state’s claim to monopoly of violence. These groups make use of military grade drones, operate freely in certain territories in all the countries of the Sahel including Nigeria, take hostages and demands for huge amounts as ransom. The 2025 Global Terrorism Index clearly shows that all is not well in the Sahel. The number of countries experiencing at least one terrorist incident increased from 58 to 66, the most countries affected since 2018. In 2024, more countries deteriorated than improved for the first time in seven years, with 45 countries reporting a higher impact from terrorism, while only 34 showed improvement. Islamic State (IS) and its affiliates remained the deadliest terrorist organization in 2024, responsible for 1,805 deaths across 22 countries. The four major terrorist organizations, IS, Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-Shabaab continued to increase their activity, with deaths attributed to these groups increasing by 11 per cent to 4,204. In 2023, these groups were active in 29 countries, which increased to 30 countries in 2024. Please take that two of these deadly terrorist groups are deeply entrenched in the Sahel. In fact, it will not be an exaggeration to say that al-Shabaab also operates in the Sahel.
Transformations in the geopolitical landscape are significantly impacting the security situation in the Sahel region. The Alliance of Sahelian States, comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, has shifted its allegiance away from Western nations, instead opting to strengthen ties with Russia and China. This strategic pivot, coupled with the bloc’s withdrawal from ECOWAS, has created opportunities for organizations like JNIM to expand their operations into coastal West Africa. Togo experienced its most challenging year regarding terrorism since the Index’s inception, illustrating the expanding reach of terrorist activities beyond traditional Sahel hotspots. Furthermore, competition for valuable natural resources, notably gold, has contributed to the ongoing instability in the region. As the seventh largest uranium producer globally, Niger has garnered increasing attention from international powers eager to secure essential resources. Russia and China have bolstered their influence in the region, providing security and economic assistance with fewer stringent requirements than their Western counterparts. Concurrently, France has been withdrawing its military presence from West Africa, indicating a significant shift in regional influence away from Western nations. The rise in terrorism within the Sahel has been alarming, with fatalities increasing nearly tenfold since 2019. By 2024, the Sahel was responsible for 51 percent of all terrorism-related deaths, and the overall number of conflict-related fatalities in the region surpassed 25,000 for the first time since the Index’s inception. Out of these deaths, 3,885 were linked to terrorism. The scale of terrorism-related deaths in this region is now ten times what it was in 2019. The Sahel has become the global focal point for terrorism, accounting for more than half of all such deaths in 2024, with an increasing number of affected countries. Five out of the ten nations most severely impacted by terrorism are located here. While Burkina Faso remains the hardest hit country, it has seen a decline in both fatalities and attacks—down by 21 and 57 percent respectively—yet it still contributes to one-fifth of all terrorism deaths worldwide. Niger serves as a stark reminder of how precarious any progress in reducing terrorism-related deaths can be; in 2024, it recorded the largest global surge in terrorist fatalities, jumping by 94 percent to a total of 930, undoing earlier gains made in 2022 when it had shown significant improvements. This situation suggests that Burkina Faso’s advancements may be temporary.
In West Africa, Islamic State West Africa (ISWAP) remains a major security concern. Although its activity has declined, the group remains locked in violent conflict with Boko Haram, leading to significant casualties and resource losses. In 2024 terrorism deaths attributed to the chapter declined by 46 per cent to 178. ISWA recorded no deaths in Benin, or Burkina Faso in 2024. These countries are now dominated by JNIM.
What fuels my concern and deep pessimism regarding the Sahel? Why did I express in the opening of this piece that we might be facing another decade of insurgency, terrorism, and banditry, despite the military’s ongoing efforts to combat these threats? The reason for my apprehension lies in the recent data published by the UNDP, which indicates that the Human Development Index (HDI) for Sahelian nations has not shown any signs of improvement. The HDI serves as a consolidated measure reflecting average achievements across crucial aspects of human development: living a long and healthy life, acquiring knowledge, and maintaining a reasonable standard of living. It is calculated as the geometric mean of normalized indices for these three dimensions. The health aspect is evaluated through life expectancy at birth, while education is gauged by the average years of schooling for adults aged 25 and older, alongside anticipated years of schooling for children of school age. The standard of living is assessed via gross national income per capita. To account for the diminishing significance of income as GNI rises, the HDI employs a logarithmic scale for income. Subsequently, the scores from these three HDI dimensions are combined into a composite index through geometric mean calculations. The HDI serves as a tool for scrutinizing national policy decisions, prompting inquiries into why two nations with identical GNI per capita can achieve divergent human development results. Such disparities can ignite discussions regarding government policy priorities.
A striking nine out of ten nations with the lowest Human Development Index (HDI) are found in Sub-Saharan Africa, with Somalia at the bottom, scoring a mere 0.380. HDI values nearing 1 reflect favorable human development, whereas those approaching 0 signify poor conditions. Six of these countries are situated in the Sahel region, including Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, South Sudan, Sudan, and the Central African Republic. For 2023, Nigeria holds an HDI score of 0.560, placing it within the Medium human development tier and ranking it 164th among 193 countries and territories. Chad’s score stands at 0.416, while Niger and Mali both sit at 0.419; the situation in the surrounding nations appears equally grim. What does this imply? It suggests that issues such as insurgency, terrorism, banditry, and violent crime are likely to persist and potentially escalate in the Sahel. According to the Global Peace Index report from the Institute of Economics and Peace, countries with low HDI are unlikely to achieve positive rankings in peace metrics. The ten nations topping the Global Peace Index—comprising Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand, Austria, Switzerland, Singapore, Portugal, Denmark, Slovenia, and Finland—enjoy high HDI scores; for instance, Denmark ranks fourth globally in human development while Switzerland is second. Given the current trajectory in the Sahel, there are few indicators that regional leaders are genuinely committed to enhancing their HDI.
Governance often occurs without public support or legitimacy due to elections lacking significance. The pervasive issue of poverty, stemming from greed, corruption, and injustice, further complicates matters. Amidst this cacophony of obstacles, no amount of military intervention can effectively combat insurgency, terrorism, and banditry within the Sahel.
Overcoming issues like insurgency, terrorism, and banditry is not an insurmountable challenge; any committed government can achieve it. Take Algeria, for instance. Once plagued by the Salafia sect’s violence, the nation took decisive steps to enhance its Human Development Index (HDI), improve governance, and alleviate poverty, ultimately transforming into a beacon of hope. Similarly, Rwanda’s journey under President Paul Kagame involved a profound national renewal followed by a focus on boosting its HDI, leading to remarkable progress in fewer than twenty years. Leaders in the Sahel and West Africa must confront reality and stop relying on the West for Foreign Direct Investments; no investor will commit to a country with a low HDI unless their interest lies solely in the arms trade. For Nigeria and its neighbors in the Sahel and West Africa to foster genuine peace and stability, they must prioritize enhancing their HDI.
It is crucial to highlight that the Human Development Index (HDI) cannot see any significant improvement in Nigeria unless state governors take it upon themselves to take the necessary and responsible actions that truly support and promote projects with a direct bearing on enhancing the HDI.
This means prioritizing initiatives that have a tangible impact on the lives of the citizens rather than investing time and resources into unnecessary and ostentatious projects such as extravagant flyovers that serve little purpose or sending party members on costly pilgrimages to holy sites in Mecca and Jerusalem, which do not address the pressing challenges faced by the populace. For Nigeria to effectively combat the persistent issues of insurgency and terrorism, a strong foundation of HDI and good governance must be established, and these two critical components cannot be realized without the active involvement and genuine commitment of state governors. As it currently stands, the fundamental problems plaguing Nigeria are not simply a matter of whether or not state police should be implemented or the availability of financial resources; rather, they stem from a profound sense of insincerity and a lack of authentic dedication among politicians, particularly state governors and the National Security Advisor, who hold the power to effect meaningful change.
